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I. INTRODUCTION 
The title of the presentation which I was asked to discuss twice 
utilizes the word "expropriation." The word is part of that semantical 
schematic of levels of private property deprivation, which includes in-
tervention, nationalization, expropriation and confiscation, each with 
its own degree of assumption of ownership and level of compensation, 
and often carrying overtones of politicization. Expropriation is perhaps 
not the most appropriate way to identify the most "popular" contempo-
rary transference of property ownership and control from foreign inves-
tors to either the private or public sector of the host nation. Expropria-
tion neither encompasses all of the above-mentioned forms of property 
deprivation, nor, more significantly, does it relate well to the somewhat 
less traumatic property transferences, where host nations go through 
property deprivation processes which have been identified nationally, 
such as "Mexicanization," "Chileanization," or "Peruvianization." 1 
These terms presumably bring more sympathy to the property transfer, 
since they are allegedly founded on a desire for increased participation 
by the host nation in the ownership and control of the means of produc-
tion. They can, of course, fit the generally accepted definition of expro-
priation, 2 as in the case of the takeover of the petroleum industry by 
Mexico in 1938, 3 or evidence a prospective policy of regulating new in-
vestments in certain areas, such as requiring all future businesses in a 
particular industrial sector to be at least in a majority sense locally 
owned and controlled. 4 
*From a paper presented at a seminar on "Foreign Trade in Latin America" in 
Tegucigalpa, Honduras and at the Syracuse symposium. 
**Professor of La~r and Director, Mexican Summer Law Program, College of Law, 
University of Florida. 
1. See, e.g., Creel, "Mexicanization ": A Case of Creeping Expropriation , 22 Sw. L.J. 
281, 285 (1968) . 
2. Expropriation denotes the taking of private property without necessarily then 
passing to state ownership, and generally is considered to include incorporation . 
3. S ee, e.g., J. SILVA HERZOG, HISTORIA DE LA ExPROPRIACION DE LAS EMPRESAS 
PETROLERAS (3d ed. 1964). 
4. See Gordon, The Contemporary Mexican Approach to Growth with Foreign Invest-
m ent: Controlled But Participatory Independence, 10 CALIF. WEST. L. REV. 1 (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as Mexican Approach]. 
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II. MANIFESTATION OF DISCONTENT 
A. Political Motivations and Implications 
The transference of ownership to host nation control has been, 
nearly without exception, politically, rather than economically moti-
vated. While there are often viable economic justifications for domestic 
ownership of the means of production, economic issues are often poorly 
expressed or arise not in the context of the prior justification for property 
transference, but rather as a later impediment, due to the inability of a 
developing nation's current economic resources to meet the demanded 
payment for the property takeovers. The past decade and a half, com-
mencing dramatically with the Cuban nationalizations, has encom-
passed a series of nationalizations in developing sectors of the world. 
They were implemented most often either by persons newly in control 
of the government or by an incumbent government wishing to sustain 
itself, but under pressures to take some dramatic action, usually toward 
foreign property, in order to frustrate a more nationalistic, ambitious, 
political adversary. The issue of foreign private investment has increas-
ingly become a major element in political campaigns in developing 
countries. It is expected to create sympathy from masses of the popula-
tion for arguments demanding change in an actual or assumed foreign 
domination of the nation's means of production and distribution. In-
creasingly, questions of foreign ownership and domination are arising 
even in the more developed sectors of the world, as evidenced by concern 
in Canada over extensive U.S. ownership of investments,5 and in Eng-
land with respect to ownership of the oil industries, particularly in light 
of the vast potential of England's role in North Sea oil production.8 
There should be no expectation that the issue of ownership of the 
means of production and distribution will prove to be a transitory prob-
lem and, in the near future, become subordinate to other contemporary 
issues. The frustration generated in developing areas by the elusive 
multinational enterprise is likely to sustain the contemporary popular-
ity of property takeovers, thus necessitating a closer look at the area of 
property deprivations in light of the Hickenlooper and Gonzalez amend-
ments.7 The need is obvious; there must be some recognition by the less 
developed nations which take over valuable foreign owned properties 
that hostilities will ensue with the developed nation. Further direct 
investments, plus the granting of credits and other developmental 
benefits, will diminish without some assurance of both reasonable pre-
5. Loehwing, Chile of the North?, BARRON'S, April 2, 1973, at 7, col. 1. 
6. Taking Over? Labor Party's Pledge to Nationalize Oil in Britain Has Some Big 
Concerns Nervous, Wall St. J., March 12, 1974, at 40, col. 1. 
7. Foreign Assistance Act of 1962 § 620(e), 76 Stat. 260 (1962), as amended, 22 U.S.C. 
§ 2370(e)(l) (Supp. V 1964). 
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dictability that nationalization will not occur,8 and if it does occur, 
assurance that some compensation will be paid. Assurances against na-
tionalization cannot be particularly effective since governments often 
change on the basis of property ownership issues.9 The reasonable expec-
tation of fair compensation therefore becomes important because no new 
government, however hostile to previous sentiments toward foreign in-
vestment, can hope to achieve economic and social goals if it is to be 
isolated from the capital exporting world for failure to provide some 
affirmative response to the compensation issue. 
B. Tactics and Strategies of Expropriation 
Despite recent recognition by less developed nations of a right to 
payment, resolution of the compensation issue has been complicated by 
creation of alleged necessary deductions from the investors' assessment 
of the property value, or direct challenges to the method of evaluation 
itself used by the foreign claimant. The latter form of challenge arose 
both in the Guatemalan takeover of United Fruit Company properties 
in 1954, 10 and initially during the Cuban takeovers commencing in 1959. 
In both cases the host nation governments indicated that the value of 
real property should be that which had been stipulated in the local tax 
rolls by the owning company, a figure which for varying reasons was 
substantially lower than any reasonable market value of the property. 
More recently, beginning with the 1969 Peruvian expropriation of prop-
erties of the International Petroleum Corporation (IPC), and continuing 
during the Chilean expropriations of copper, the host country nations 
have formulated certain deductions which were subtracted from the 
values set for the foreign properties by their owners. In the case of Peru, 
the deduction was based on the theory that the oil in the ground had 
always belonged to Peru, and that there should be a deduction for Peru-
vian properties sold by the company over a long span of years. 11 The 
Chilean takeover of copper industries resulted in a new constitutional 
amendment requiring the newly nationalized companies to make an 
excess profits deduction on their Chilean operations. 12 The deduction in 
both the Chilean and Peruvian situations conveniently exceeded the 
claimed value of the properties, thus purportedly negating any alleged 
8. See Gordon, Predictability of Nationalization of Foreign Private Investment in 
Latin America, 1 SYR. J. INT'L L. & CoM. 123 (1973). 
9. Id. at 142. 
10. Id. at 133. 
11. See Goodwin, Letter from Peru, NEW YORKER, May 17, 1969, at 41. The back-
ground of the controversy, as prepared by IPC, is contained in The La Brea y Parinas 
Controversy (1969 ed.). 
12. Chilean Law of July 15, 1971, concerning Natural Resources and their Nationali-
zation, [1971] translated in 10 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1067 (1971) . 
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international law requirement of compensation. Consequently, capital-
exporting sectors of the world are going to face increasingly difficult 
issues regarding compensation if there is to be any international consist-
ency as to the right to compensation. 
The focus upon the petroleum industry in this symposium is appro-
priate in discussing threats of expropriation, since it is from those sec-
tors of the world which possess critically needed products, such as petro-
leum, that the threats of expropriation most often arise. The crucial 
need for petroleum and the success of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) has had a spillover effect to other 
mineral-producing nations, particularly those which produce copper 
and bauxite, and to such areas as lumber and basic food production, 
including bananas and coffee. In addition to the developing nations' 
identification with critically needed products, the success of expropri-
atory threats is directly proportional to the concentration of products 
in a group of nations committed to a uniform policy. There are attri-
butes shared by the newly formed bauxite producing nations, banana 
producing nations and the earlier organized copper producing nations, 
which suggest a less successful future than the recent achievement of 
the OPEC nations. 
C. Defenses and Reprisals 
Counteractions in the developed world arising from these threats of 
product unions have taken several forms. They are evidenced in such 
direct forms as U.S. intervention in the Guatemalan takeovers of United 
Fruit in 1954, or intervention by the investor itself-when it possesses 
sufficient independent power in the host nation-such as has been dis-
closed regarding the International Telephone and Telegraph Company 
in Chile.13 Less overt threats evolve from unilateral legislation such as 
the Hickenlooper and Gonzalez amendments, which nevertheless 
amount to economic retaliation, and even from political policy such as 
the 1972 statement of the executive branch on policy toward nationali-
zation.14 
Some nationalizations may be averted without this counterthreat 
and conflict through increased local participation by foreign investors 
and by affirmative, realistic policy changes to satisfy the host nations. 
Examples of the latter include those of the United States vis-a-vis Israel 
in light of Arab oil pressures, and toward Argentina and Canada regard-
ing the sale to Cuba of automotive products and locomotives manufac-
13. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON MULTINATIONAL CORPO-
RATIONS , 93D CONG., lsT SESS., INTERNATIONAL TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH Co. AND CHILE, 
1970-71 (Comm. Print 1973). 
14. U.S. Statement on Economic Assistance and Investment in Developing Nations, 
.Jan. 19, 1972, 8 WEEKLY COMPILATION PRES. Docs. 64. 
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tured by U.S.-owned foreign corporations. 15 It is perhaps unrealistic to 
believe that many companies will willingly seek to initiate the reduction 
-of their participation in a profitable venture, and yet it is difficult to 
condone threats of expropriation conditioned upon changes in one's 
foreign policy. 
The threats of expropriation evolve from developmental policies of 
the Third World which are not necessarily policies directed to other 
nations, but increasingly are illustrations of frustration in dealing with 
the foreign owned multinational enterprises. Developmental policy, it 
is expected, will increasingly be identified with the frustrations evolv-
ing from the less developed nations' inability to control the interna-
tional parent and, indeed, the problem of even identifying the allegi-
ances of the multinational enterprise. As multinational enterprises 
continue to seek methods of reducing a legitimate link and, consequent-
ly, some level of compelled obedience to a specific nation, Third World 
nations concurrently lose the ability to identify an entity's operations 
with political aspirations of the enterprise's now uncertain home base. 
Much of the developing nationalism in less developed countries, which 
has led to property takeovers, has evolved from identifying investments 
with particular nations, and often, nationalizations have amounted to 
a retaliation against foreign owned private business for unassociated 
acts or political philosophies of the foreign investor's government. 
III. CAUSES OF DISCONTENT 
It is desirable to identify the basis for the discontent of the less 
developed nations toward the multinational enterprise in order to deter-
mine how it affects policy toward private investment. Certainly there is 
a fear based on mere size when it is realized that a number of foreign 
investors have annual sales larger than the gross national products of a 
great many developing nations. 16 But the fear is not based on size alone; 
it reaches rather to the market power resulting from the size of the 
entity, as well as evolving from an acknowledged jealousy over the 
greater management sophistication of the foreign investor and, most 
importantly, a concern, albeit often unjustified, that a nation's finances 
are subjected to the uncontrolled flexibility of fund movements of the 
multinational enterprise. 
15. See, e.g., Locomotive Sale to Cuba Signed by Canadian Firms, Wall St. J., March 
19, 1974, at 14, col. 2; U.S. Mulls Car Sales to Cuba, Miami Herald, Feb. 20, 1974, at 2-
A, col. 3. 
16. The 167 largest U.S. corporations in 1973 had sales in excess of $1 billion, nine 
larger than $10 billion, with General Motors leading with sales of $35, 798,289,000. 
FORTUNE, May, 1974, at 232. 
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A. Split Developing Among Less Developed Nations 
While the Third World has tended to view the multinational enter-
prise as a threat to the collective body of developing nations, the oil 
crisis has evidenced the fact that the theoretical cohesiveness of the less 
developed world is weaker than initially believed. The developing world 
appears to be polarizing into at least two groups which will have to deal 
both with the multinational enterprises and with each other. I would 
identify these groups as the large (usually), less developed nations with 
vast quantities of known and producing natural resources for export, 
and, by contrast, the smaller, less developed nations without vast 
quantities of known and producing natural resources. In the former 
group, using Latin America as an area example, we would initially iden-
tify Venezuela because of its vast oil resources. Additionally we should 
include Brazil and perhaps, assuming resource production returns to 
more efficient levels, Peru and Chile as well. Other large nations, such 
as Argentina, Mexico and Columbia, probably should not be included 
in this category since they are not currently producing large quantities 
of needed natural resources for export. Perhaps we should add smaller 
nations to the group where they possess large quantities of resources for 
export, such as Jamaica with its vast quantities of bauxite, and possibly 
Ecuador with its comparatively newly discovered oil and gas reserves. 
The bargaining power of these nations is often enhanced through asso-
ciation with other nations producing similar products, as illustrated by 
OPEC. 
The second category-the smaller, less developed nations without 
vast amounts of known and producing raw materials-includes, in Latin 
America, the nations of the Central American Common Market and 
such South American nations as Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay. It is 
this author's belief that the group of larger, less developed nations will 
not find their cultural identity with the smaller nations sufficiently 
strong so as to override nationalistic sentiments for individual nation 
growth. This will be explored later with particular emphasis on the 
current attitude of Venezuela toward supplying oil products to the Cen-
tral American nations. 
B. Economic Grievances 
Developmental policy of both groups of Third World nations is 
affected by economic, political and social forces. The alleged unfair 
advantage of multinational enterprises with regard to wage levels, rela-
tions with suppliers and customers, and special benefits from local fiscal 
authorities, may vary depending on the size of the developing nation 
and the severity of the need for its product. Domination by large corpo-
rations in these areas should not be unexpected; within the United 
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States itself, the large corporations possess such advantages over the 
smaller businesses. The issue should rather be identification of the 
·unfair misuse of potential benefits accruing from size. The ability to 
regulate a multinational enterprise and control the use of its economic 
power within the host nation will be directly dependent upon the poten-
tial capacity of the host nation to assume control and ownership of the 
business and to successfully operate it if compliance with government 
restrictions is unsatisfactory. The Venezuelan government does not ap-
pear at all hesitant in negotiating with the foreign oil industry for 
greater control, while such dominant entities as United Brands in the 
Central American nations retain significant powers of persuasion over 
national economic policy .17 Soon after the recent formation of the 
Union of Banana Exporting Countries, at which time a two and one-
half cent per pound export tax increase was adopted, the Standard 
Fruit Company in Honduras was allegedly attempting to persuade the 
Honduran government not to comply with the agreed-upon increase. 18 
One might predict greater success than Exxon's attempted persuasion 
to have Venezuela roll back crude oil prices, since bananas are not a 
critically needed commodity. 
The inability to regulate the multinational enterprise parent of a 
local subsidiary often results in such frustration that concepts are for-
mulated which may have widespread disequilibrating effects. The de-
velopment in Argentina of the concept of the conjunto economico, the 
economic unit, evidences this frustration in a result which effectively 
pierced the corporate veil of a foreign owned domestic subsidiary solely 
on the grounds of commercial dependence by the subsidiary on the 
parent. 19 I think it is reasonable to assume that we may witness more of 
this type of reaction as the frustration over the host countries' inability 
to effectively regulate the multinational enterprise continues. 
Claims that multinational enterprises exhaust local resources are 
no less untrue than similar claims made to a host nation company 
similarly involved in extractive industries. Host nations would not have 
sought the assistance of outside investment in extractive industries had 
they been able to develop those industries on their own, and, conse-
quently the issue should not be whether the host nations are being 
exploited, but whether or not they are obtaining the greatest share possi-
ble in the foreign extraction of their natural resources. We are likely to 
17. United Brands was formerly known as United Fruit. 
18. More recently, Standard Fruit, owned by Castle & Cooke, has been exerting 
pressures in Costa Rica, where it offered to sell its banana facilities to that Latin American 
government because of the imposition of a steep export tax. Wall St. J., May 22, 1974, at 
26, col. 4. 
19. See Gordon, Argentine Jurisprudence: The Parke Davis and Deltee Cases, 6 LAW. 
AMERICAS 320 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Gordon]. 
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see much more testing by less developed nations in an effort to deter-
mine how far the host nations may increase the local share without 
economic collapse. Venezuela, although interested in obtaining full 
ownership of the oil concessions prior to the commencement of their 
expiration in 1983, is appropriately concerned about the resultant effect 
on the nation's ability to develop the vast Orinoco area without foreign 
capital. 
The interest of the host nation is not solely to determine how much 
of a monetary share it can gain from an extractive industry, but rather 
how far the nation is able to go in redirecting the operations of an 
extractive, export oriented industry, to achieve host country develop-
ment goals. These goals include improving the nation's own technology 
and utilizing such resources as fuel for the production of other forms of 
industrial development. The Arab nations' interest in lowering petro-
leum production is both to conserve resources and to foster the devel-
opment of such industries as petrochemicals. 
Another concern over multinational enterprises is that they inter-
fere with the implementation of a host nation's economic policy. This 
is certainly true in the sense that wherever a nation is dependent upon 
the export of a single or a few products for the greatest percentage of its 
gross national product, its economic policies will fluctuate according to 
the world environment within which those products move. The effect 
may be both from world pricing, and, of significantly more concern in 
terms of overt influences on the nation's economic policies, from actions 
of the multinational in regulating production. Such regulation is under-
taken not for the benefit of the host nation, but rather for that of the 
shareholder of the multinational corporation, as a way of assuring the 
existence of reserves closer to the multinational's home base, by first 
exploring those at further distances. 
The external economic forces of the multinational enterprise are 
lessening in the case of our first group of developing countries, those 
less developed countries with vast known and producing natural re-
sources. While this may mean a lessening of external economic regula-
tion by the capital exporting nations, it does not necessarily foretell a 
benefit to be spread ratably among all the Third World nations. The 
benefit is more likely one which will accrue to the first group and often 
at the expense of the second, the smaller less developed nations without 
vast known and producing natural resources. There is a very serious 
potential effect to these nations, evidenced by recent meetings between 
representatives of the Central American Common Market nations and 
Venezuela. The former nations were desirous of a moratorium on pricing 
of oil by Venezuela, but received only preferential treatment promises. 
The resultant cost for the higher priced crude oil from Venezuela is 
expected to be approximately $80 million annually for Honduras and 
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$250 million annually for Costa Rica. The Central American nations had 
been hopeful that benefits of the new power of the oil producing nations 
might at least partially accrue to Latin America in general, while the 
Venezuelan response seems to indicate quite clearly that the common 
Spanish heritage is not as strong as the contemporary nationalism in 
Venezuela. 
C. Political Interference-Overt and Subtle 
The second major area of alleged influence by the multinational 
enterprise involves politics. A desired effect on host country policies may 
be sought either directly by the enterprise, or indirectly through re-
quested pressure by the U.S. State Department on the less developed 
nation. The direct effect by large foreign corporations on political pro-
cesses in the Third World has some historical substantiation. Large 
corporations, particularly those dealing with primary agricultural prod-
ucts, have in the past exerted such strong forces that it was often be-
lieved that the companies were directly responsible for designating pres-
idents. Political forces have not altogether ceased to exist, although it 
appears they have become more subtle, e.g., the recent experience of 
ITT in Chile. 20 Evidence in the Congressional hearings suggests that 
ITT representatives in Peru encouraged the Peruvian government to 
pay ITT for expropriated properties so that they would then be justi-
fied in isolating the takeover of the International Petroleum Company 
as a separate issue, and not one which should be identified with a gen-
eral governmental policy of expropriation without compensation.21 
The ITT experience in Chile indicates that multinationals based in 
the United States have not had significant success recently in persuad-
ing the State Department to assume management desired attitudes to-
ward foreign nations. Mere "presence" always has some effect and em-
bassies will continue to play roles as persuasive forces, as will the various 
credit agencies and such investment supportive programs as the Over-
seas Private Investment Corporation. There will obviously be continued 
policy input to these organizations by U.S. based multinational enter-
prises. Some evidence of successful corporate persuasion of State De-
partment policy is nevertheless provided by the alleged pressure of U.S. 
multinationals interested in the large nickel deposits discovered in 
Burundi in 1973, which led to requests that the U.S. executive branch 
change its policy toward Burundi-a change which may be indicated 
by the recommencement of aid flows not long after the companies' 
policies were made known to the State Department. 22 
20. See note 13 supra. 
21. See note 13 supra, at 14. 
22. Morris, The Triumph of Money and Power, N.Y. Times, March 3, 1974, § 4, at 
13, col. 5. 
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With the increasing awareness of power by the large, less developed 
nations, there has been not only a lessening of the effectiveness of exter-
nal political forces on the nations' policies, but an increasing ability of 
those nations to influence the political affairs of the capital exporting 
world. The Arab nations have been notably successful in affecting U.S. 
policy towards Israel, in bringing Secretary of State Kissinger into a pro-
Arab dialogue, and in partially splitting the Atlantic Alliance. Argen-
tina, perhaps not fully qualified as a member of the first group of the 
less developed nations, nevertheless is an important industrial nation 
of Latin America. It appears to have achieved some success in convinc-
ing the United States not to carry out the sanctions of the Trading with 
the Enemy Act in attempting to prevent U.S. automotive manufactur-
ers in Argentina and locomotive manufacturers in Canada from selling 
their goods to Cuba.23 
The effect of such actions on the small, less developed nations with-
out the power base obtained through the possession of natural resources 
may be severe. Were Ecuador to condition its sale of petroleum and gas 
to the United States on increased purchases of bananas, the result could 
be to harm one or more of the Central American nations which lacked 
similar bargaining capacity. We may expect to continue to witness a 
shifting of political forces in favor of the large, less developed nations, 
with more than a counter-balancing effect on the capital exporting na-
tions, but a deleterious effect on many of the small, less developed Third 
World countries. 
D. Deculturalization 
The third category of alleged force of the multinational involves 
social pressures. Since the publication of J.J. Servan-Schreiber's, The 
American Challenge, 24 both developed and less developed nations of the 
world, which have been host to substantial American direct investment, 
have been concerned with a deculturalization of the host nation. It is 
often difficult to distinguish deculturalization from the adoption of eco-
nomically efficient methods of operation. The elimination of the siesta 
by law both in Honduras and several Mexican cities may have a signifi-
cant impact on the structure of the Latin American family; on the other 
hand it provides economies in that the time spent in commuting to work 
is halved and, consequently, there is a significant reduction in fuel con-
sumption. With fewer people returning home for lunch, there may be a 
need for restructuring the working hours and perhaps even for the elimi-
nation of some servants, while there will be an increased demand for new 
23. See note 15 supra. 
24. Published in 1968. 
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luncheon service facilities within the cities. The multinational enter-
prises have contributed to changes in work schedules and have had an 
impact in the area of distribution procedures, as evidenced by the in-
creased appearance of franchising operations in less developed areas. 
Deculturalization has also come from sectors other than the multina-
tional enterprise. Nations such as Mexico have adopted academic calen-
dars similar to those in the United States, and concern has been ex-
pressed that such children's programs as Sesame Street and Electric 
Company have not been adequately sensitive to local cultural patterns, 
but are instead teaching children foreign (United States) cultural pat-
terns. 
The effect of deculturalization on a small less developed country 
may be to lessen that country's capacity, if such capacity currently 
exists, to rely upon the common (e.g., Spanish) cultural base with the 
larger, less developed nations, from which to argue for common solutions 
to a variety of economic developmental problems. Hopefully, large and 
small less developed nations will be able to accept economically desira-
ble changes to traditional social structures, but eliminate those which 
possess insufficient benefits to offset the cultural losses. 
IV. EASING OF THE DISCONTENT 
A. Three Areas of Possible Control 
Resolution of the frustration of both groups of less developed coun-
tries over their inability to control multinational enterprise may come 
about in one or more of three ways. It may come through control of 
multinational corporations by their home countries or by a multina-
tional regulatory agency such as the United Nations, or it may be 
brought about by increased control over multinational enterprise activi-
ties within each less developed nation. 
1. HOME COUNTRY CONTROL 
President Echevarria of Mexico presented a "Charter of Economic 
Rights" at a meeting of UNCTAD in Chile in 1972,25 the essence of 
which was a concentration on the first two methods of governing the 
multinational entity. The Charter proposed legislation within the devel-
oped nations to control their own corporations' activities and by devel-
opment of an international agency. I would have to submit that neither 
of these alternatives is likely to be achieved in the near future. There 
appears to be no identifiable national policy among the developed coun-
25. See also President Echeverrias comments on the Charter of Economic Duties and 
Rights of States, in Annual Report of the President, Sept. 1972, cited in VISION, Dec. 16, 
1972, at 22. 
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tries to assist developing nations by restricting the activities of their 
corporations abroad in the manner urged by developing nations. Latin 
American nations have long been requesting special preferences from 
the United States for Latin American exports, without much success. 
The suggestion of additional control over corporations presents two 
questions: whether there is already too great an attempt to govern 
extra-territorial activities of U.S. corporations through such methods as 
the antitrust laws and the Trading with the Enemy Act; and whether 
the United States could effectively control corporate conduct abroad. 
For the United States to dictate how a company may act in a foreign 
nation, may interfere with the host nation's right to govern the conduct 
of corporations within its area. This suggests that what the less devel-
oped nations mean when they urge the application of extra-territorial 
laws is the adoption by the developed nations of laws clearly not incon-
sistent with less developed nation policies toward the governance of 
foreign corporations within their borders. The legislatures of developed 
nations would not respond favorably to such a concept. 
2. INTERNATIONAL AGENCY CONTROL 
The second alternative, the development of an international agency 
to govern multinational corporations, does not give rise to any greater 
hope of success. The nations of the world have evidenced an inability 
to effectively utilize international organizations to govern such areas as 
the scope of territorial seas; it is unlikely that they would agree on a 
foreign investment code acceptable to industrialized nations. Further, 
the imbalance within the United Nations in favor of many extremely 
small developing countries has increasingly isolated the General Assem-
bly to a position which cannot hope to have a major part in world 
development. At most, an international agency might become an infor-
mation gathering entity, or seek to develop such problem-solving proce-
dures as arbitration. The experience with arbitration, however, suggests 
that even that area of governance of corporate operations is not well 
accepted. None of the Latin American nations have adopted the Con-
vention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 26 and indeed the 
Andean Common Market group has rejected the concept of arbitration 
outside of the Andean nations.27 
26. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and 
Nationals of Other States, June 1, 1966, [1966] 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S . No. 6090. See 
Summers, Arbitration and Latin America, 3 CALIF. WEST. INT'L L.J. 1 (1972). 
27. Standard Regime for Treatment of Foreign Capital and for Treatment of Marks, 
Patents, Licenses and Royalties, Andean Commission, Decision 24 of Dec. 31, 1970, art. 
51 [hereinafter cited as Decision 24]. 
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3. LOCAL CONTROL 
If the first two alternatives do not succeed, it appears that the less 
developed nations are left to develop domestic regulatory policies to 
apply to the activities of multinational enterprises operating within 
their nations. The Argentine development of the conjunto economico 
theory evidences how extensive the frustrations within Latin America 
have become.28 Regulation within Latin American nations may come 
through a variety of concepts implemented by legislative acts. Several 
have been introduced during the past few years. Nations are increas-
ingly adopting legislation which limits the entry of new foreign invest-
ment to certain areas. Frequently, areas considered essential for na-
tional development, such as banking, insurance, transportation, etc. are 
limited to local government ownership, while other sectors may be pri-
vately owned but limited to local majority ownership and control, with 
a balance of the industrial sector open to foreign investment. 29 In some 
cases, however, certain preferences will be granted only when a foreign 
investment assumes a minority position, even where the industry is not 
one of those considered crucial to host country development. Other leg-
islation, governs the continuing operation of businesses, is specially 
directed to the transfer of technology, and results in a greater control 
over such areas as royalty payments, sublicensing rights and the utili-
zation of those rights upon the termination of the agreement. 3° Further 
legislation affecting current investments involves fade-out require-
ments, which essentially require that current foreign owned operations 
turn over at least a majority of their ownership and control to host 
nation entities within stipulated periods of time.31 Much of the legisla-
tion looks to increased utilization of joint ventures, whereby developing 
countries may benefit from needed foreign technology while retaining 
control over the entity. Several developing areas of Latin America are 
examining the restrictive joint venture legislation of Eastern Europe 
and, indeed, are looking beyond the control of foreign investment to 
the social forms of property ownership prevalent in Eastern European 
nations.:12 
B. Strengthening the Bargaining Position 
In addition to increased legislation, there will be a further strength-
ening of economic unions and commodity power blocks. The Central 
American Common Market's disastrous breakdown which partially re-
28. See Gordon, supra note 19, at 325. 
29. See generally Mexican Approach, supra note 4. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. See Peru Mulls Wide Social Property Reform, Miami Herald, Sept. 19, 1973, at 
8-B, col. 1. 
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sulted from the Honduran-Salvadorian border dispute, should have 
clearly evidenced to that economic union that their position vis-a-vis 
both larger, less developed countries, as well as the United States, is 
worsening in the absence of a strong Central American Common Mar-
ket. The comparative position of the CACM in relation to other, less 
developed countries is illustrated by the fact that Mexico has to some 
extent replaced the United States as the "Colossus to the North" of 
Central America. The Andean Common Market and its restrictive Deci-
sion 24, which includes both joint venture legislation with fade-out pro-
visions and repatriation limitations, is evidence of the power of a signifi-
cant economic union regulating foreign investment. 33 
The current bargaining strength illustrated by the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries has given rise to the formation of other 
commodity blocks, both in the areas of raw materials and agricultural 
commodities. It is highly questionable, however, whether areas other 
than petroleum are likely to acquire such effective power through organ-
ization. The organized copper nations may have difficulty because such 
countries as the United States are nearly self-sufficient in copper. The 
bauxite producing nations have also recently formed an organization 
which may effectively drive aluminum companies to develop lower 
grade deposits in countries which react by remaining outside of the 
bauxite group, and thus benefit by production of their poorer quality 
ore. Furthermore, Australia is one of the leading bauxite producers and 
does not appear generally amenable to the use of power as contemplated 
by three other bauxite producing nations. For such minerals as tin, other 
substitutes such as aluminum, steel and plastics, are available for many 
uses. Agricultural commodities often differ from minerals in that the 
demand is generally elastic, due primarily to the lack of need for the 
commodities and the availability of substitutes. Coffee producing na-
tions are aware that the U.S. consumer will reduce consumption or 
substitute other beverages if prices are increased. The newly forming 
organization of banana growing nations has increased the price of ba-
nanas moderately, without knowing whether the effect will be to lessen 
the demand for bananas and increase the use of substitutes. 
Current high prices for copper and other minerals, as well as for 
many other agricultural commodities, are not attributable to the power 
of organized producing country groups, but are rather the result of infla-
tionary phenomena involving rapidly increasing demands. But these 
demands may be satisfied by substitute products in the face of unrea-
sonable price increases. 
33. Decision 24, supra note 27, arts. 28-30, 37. 
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C. Learning from Third World Brethren 
In developing attitudes toward dealing with multinational enter-
prises, less developed nations, particularly the smaller nations, are in-
creasingly looking, for developmental guidance, to the more developed 
of their Third World brethren, rather than to the large industrialized 
nations of the world. Honduras, for example, has been considering the 
Mexican real estate trust device for dealing with the developmental 
problems in the Bay Islands. 34 For the development of tourist facilities 
in that area, Honduras has been following the evolution of Mexico's 
state owned resort development, Cancun, off the Yucatan coast. The 
Peruvian government, seeking to satisfy a diversity of political posi-
tions, has looked to Yugoslavia for the adoption of concepts dealing 
with ownership of the means of production. Peru had adopted, to a 
limited degree, the worker's socialism concept of Yugoslavia, where 
certain elements of the means of production are owned neither by pri-
vate investors nor the state, but by the workers involved in the industry. 
I believe it reasonable to suggest that there will be an increasing 
tendency for nations to look to the Eastern European sphere, since de-
velopment in Eastern Europe often illustrates how far Western entities 
are willing to accept joint ownership and control in order to gain access 
to new markets. While there are vast differences between the markets 
of Eastern Europe and those in such Third World areas as Latin Amer-
ica, the European patterns nevertheless illustrate that companies are 
often willing to live with a great deal more local participation in man-
agement and ownership than they have evidenced in their dealing with 
Latin American nations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The future of the multinational enterprise in developing world sec-
tors seems to be one of having to live with a variety of regulatory devices 
adopted by those nations, rather than being governed by any interna-
tional code of conduct. Indeed, the multinational corporations undoubt-
edly prefer this view, since they are thus able to influence individual 
nations to adopt positions different from collective nation groups, and 
may benefit from playing one nation against another. The smaller of the 
less developed countries have the most difficult time ahead. They do not 
possess the power to enact and expect compliance with restrictive legis-
lation and, unless they join with larger economically integrated groups, 
the developmental gap which Raoul Prebisch has said is increasing be-
34. See TANCER & ZANOTTI, THE MEXICAN LAW OF FOREIGN REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT 
IN THE PROHIBITED ZONES: AN OVERVIEW, 1971-73 (1974). 
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tween the industrialized nations of the world and the less developed 
countries, will also increase between the smaller, less developed nations 
and those larger, less developed nations which possess sufficient re-
sources to allow them a power base. It may well be that the comment 
of Porfirio Diaz regarding the relationship of Mexico and the United 
States may be altered in the future to read "Pobre Centro America, Tan 
Lejos de Dios, y Tan Cerca de Mexico." 
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